The War in the DRC: Unveiling the Hidden Power of Agency
The Rwandan-backed M23 rebels continue their relentless advance, capturing villages, towns, and cities in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The fall of the city of Bukavu, the last major stronghold, after a more than three-year offensive, symbolises a new turn for the worse in communities already devastated by three decades of war. As a native of Bukavu — a city where I lived for almost half my life and to which I return several times a year — I am deeply saddened. Moreover, as a researcher and ethnographer in the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC), I feel an overwhelming sense of powerlessness in the face of the security and humanitarian uncertainty that weighs on the inhabitants of this cross-border region. These populations — predominantly peasants and the poorest strata of these countries1 — are the first victims of warring parties’ obsession with power and sovereignty. Finally, as a lawyer and a political scientist, I am disturbed by the media coverage of this war. The conflict, which was triggered by the M23’s capture of Chenu et Runyonyi in November 2021, is rooted in a complex history of regional wars. The First Congo War in 1996 saw the occupation of Bukavu by Rwandan-backed rebels, some of whom are now part of M233. The wide range of conflicting interpretations and diversity of analyses make it difficult to understand this protracted conflict, as different actors approach the conflict through the prism of their own values and interests. The asymmetry of information is also exacerbated by the speed at which news is disseminated and the spread of fake news, which fuels incorrect or incomplete analyses.
Therefore, I feel it is crucial and urgent to speak out to clarify the keys of this conflict. I do not intend to repeat the arguments that dominate media discussions (e.g., the role of Rwanda, minerals, governance, and international actors). Instead, I analyse the current phase of this conflict using a key interpretive framework derived from the second wave of debates in African political science (1980-1990). This effort recognises the fundamentally political nature of African political actors’ discourses and practices. It also moves beyond reductionist approaches that frame African events as mechanical and inevitable, actors’ actions as impulsive and random, and social phenomena as dogmatic and culturalist. We must be wary of these problematic interpretations of the conflict, which reduce armed violence to ethnic conflicts and problematic governance. Such reduction obscures the strategies and interests of actors involved in a cycle of power struggles. The agency of these actors — their ability to act in the face of structural constraints — is influenced by ever-changing economic structures that, while stable, are always shifting.