On 24 October 2024, recently re-elected President Félix Tshisekedi announced publicly for the first time his intention to change the Constitution, claiming it had been drafted by “foreigners in a foreign country” and suggesting that it would hold back efforts to fight the war against the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) in the east of the country. The Constitution referred to was adopted by referendum in December 2005 following the provisions of the 2003 Global and Inclusive Agreement (AGI) which, officially, put an end to the Second Congolese War. Twenty years after its signature and the integration of themain belligerents into the political system, the DRC has seen four rounds of general elections.

Recent developments compel us to raise the question of the legacy of the AGI in Congo’s existing political system: first the boycott of the last elections by the political party of former President Joseph Kabila, followed by President Tshisekedi’s announcement to change the Constitution, and  finally, the declared intention of Corneille Nangaa, leader of the Alliance  du Fleuve Congo (AFC), to seize power in Kinshasa by force with the help of the M23.

While the current institutions resulting from a power-sharing agreement have had some sustainability and stability and even saw the first “peaceful” change in power in the history of the country, following the 2018 elections, violent conflicts in the DRC did not end with the implementation of the 2006 Constitution but have become even more protracted, fragmented and violent. Today, war in eastern DRC has even evolved into a serious threat to regime stability.

The AGI and the institutional strategy resulting from the transitional period (2003–06) have entangled conflict deeply within the larger political dynamics of the DRC. It forces us to take a closer look at their interconnection, not only to better understand political processes in Kinshasa, but also to fully unravel conflict drivers in the eastern parts of the country. The two decades that have passed since the AGI, and the recent presidential call for Constitutional change, invite us to look at “the hidden costs of power-sharing” introduced by the AGI (Tull & Mehler 2005).

This report offers a detailed analysis of “postwar” political dynamics in the DRC following the AGI. It has the ambition to provide a tool for a better understanding of the changes that these dynamics have produced in Congo’s political system and in existing drivers of conflict in the eastern parts of the country. The analysis is informed by a database of all members of Congolese government since the start of the transitional period in 2003. While we acknowledge the limits of this database (members of parliament, Provincial Governments and Parliaments and other important public positions are not included in the database), we argue that it allows us to reveal how the current regime, through the continuation of a politics of inclusion, is currently building a strategy for political change.